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WHO SHOULD PROTECT THE NATIVE AMERICAN
CHILD: A PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE BETWEEN THE
RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL VERSES THE RIGHTS
OF THE INDIAN TRIBE
Michelle Zehndert
Every child without regard to race, colo;, sex, language, religion, political
or social origin, property, birth or other status shall be entitled:
* To special protection to develop in a healthy and normal manner
physically, mentally, morally, and socially with freedom and dignity;
* To a name and nationality from birth;
* To adequate nutrition, housing, recreation, and medical services
to grow and develop in health;
* To special treatment, education and care required by a physical
mental or social handicap;
* To love and understanding and the right to grow and develop in
an atmosphere of affection and security;
* To be among the first to receive protection and relief;
* To be protected against all forms of neglect, cruelty and exploita-
tion.'
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I. INTRODUCTION
Somewhere on the Oglala Sioux Reservation in South
Dakota, six-year-old Robert is being hit by his mother. After the
beating is over, slight bruises can be seen on his arms and back.
The bruises will soon go away, but the emotional trauma will not.
For Robert, being hit is a daily occurrence. Tribal authorities
fail to intervene and the abuse continues. This crime would
have gone unaddressed because no other authority could have
intervened and prosecuted Robert's mother. Then in 1994,
Congress gave the federal government jurisdiction over all
assaults against children on federal reservations and Robert's
mother could be charged with a violation of federal law. The
spirit of the 1994 Amendment was necessary to protect Indian
children, but its scope is at serious odds with the original scope
and purpose of federal criminal jurisdiction on Indian reserva-
tions.
All children deserve to be protected and to have crimes
against them stopped. This truism should apply no matter what
race the child is or where the child lives. Despite this apparent
truism, physically abused Indian children were not always
protected equally under the law. A hierarchy of protection on
the reservations existed. Physically abused Indian children who
are abused by another Indian were at the bottom of this
hierarchy. Non-Indian children on the reservations were
afforded the greatest legal protection, followed by the Indian
child who was abused by a non-Indian. The 1994 Legislature
changed this inequity and offered protection to physically abused
children no matter what their race. The Legislature amended
the laws applicable to child abuse to enable federal prosecution
of all assaults, ranging from the most minor of assaults to the
most serious. The Amendment, however, failed to protect tribal
sovereignty and to take into account the historical theories
behind the prosecution of crimes on reservations.
1996]
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This article compares the past inequities suffered by
physically abused children on the reservation with the current
status of the law and offers a new statute to balance the rights of
the tribe with the rights of all children. Throughout the
discussion of these issues, examples are offered to assist the
reader in understanding the issues discussed. The first segment
of this paper discusses the current status of the law and explores
the factors used to determine who has criminal jurisdiction on
Indian reservations. Part II then explores the different levels of
protection given to physically abused children, both on and off
the reservation, before and after the 1994 Amendment. Finally,
Part III offers a solution to the problem of protecting physically
abused children without ignoring either tribal sovereignty or the
historical development of the prosecution of crimes on the
reservation. The proposed amendment offers specific child
physical abuse definitions that protect Indian children and
maintain tribal sovereignty.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS
Criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by Indians2
is a complicated issue. A number of questions must be asked
and answered to determine the correct prosecuting authority.
These questions include: Did the offense occur on or off a
reservation? Is the State a Public Law 280 State? Was the
perpetrator Indian or non-Indian? Was the victim Indian or
non-Indian? What type of offense is alleged? It is only after
these questions are answered that prosecution of the offender
2. The federal code defines "Indian" as:
[A] 11 persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian
tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are descendants of
such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present
boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further include all other
person of one-half or more Indian blood.
25 U.S.C. § 479 (1994).
"Indian" is perhaps an improper and inadequate term to refer to the group of
people who inhabited North American long before Anglo-Saxons. The author
recognizes the inadequacy of the term Indian. The term shall be used, however, to
maintain consistency with case law and commentary on this topic. See generally Allison
M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The
Supreme Court's Changing Vision, 55 U. PI'r. L. REv. 1, 3 n.6 (1993) (contrasting
appropriate terms).
[V/ol. 22
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can occur.' While only crimes subject to federal prosecution are
the subject of this article, a brief overview of the general issue of
criminal jurisdiction on reservations is helpful to the reader's
understanding of the inherent problems in the 1994 Amend-
ment. During the following discussion of the substantive law on
jurisdiction, the reader may find it helpful to refer to the chart
provided in the appendix to this paper.'
A. What are Public Law 280 Reservations?
Originally, the federal government had concurrent jurisdic-
tion with the tribes over certain reservation crimes. The states
had no criminal jurisdiction on the reservations unless the crime
involved a non-Indian defendant and a non-Indian victim.' In
1953, this clear separation ofjurisdiction ended with the passage
of what is commonly referred to as Public Law 2806 (PL-280).
PL-280 transferred all criminal and civil jurisdiction on certain
reservations to the states the reservations were located in and
permitted other states to assume jurisdiction from the federal
government if they so chose.7 The passage of PL-280 was
3. See State v. Marek, 736 P.2d 1314 (Idaho 1987) (providing an analysis of
determining what law applies to a crime that occurred on an Indian reservation).
4. Using the chart set forth in the appendix, a person seeking to determine who
has jurisdiction should ask the following questions, in the following order.
1) Where did the crime occur-on a PL-280 reservation or a nonPL-280
reservation?
2) Is the defendant an Indian as defined under federal law?
3) What race is the victim? (the race of the victim is irrelevant if the reservation
is a PL-280 reservation).
4) If both the victim and the defendant are Indian, what type of crime is alleged
to have occurred?
The significance of these questions and their answers are fully explored in Part I-A to
I-C of this paper.
5. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978); New York
ex reL Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946); Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896);
United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881); FELIx S. COHEN, HANDBOOK ON
FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 298 (Rennard Strickland ed., 1982); Steven M. Johnson,
Jurisdiction: CriminalJurisdiction and Enforcement Problems on Indian Reservations in the Wake
of Oliphan 7 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 291, 295 (1979).
6. SeeAct of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588-90 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162).
7. See Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over
Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REv. 535, 540 (1975).
Public Law 280, entitled "State jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against
Indians in the Indian country" provides in relevant part:
(a) Each of the States or Territories listed in the following table shall have
jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas of
Indian country listed opposite the name of the State or Territory to the same
1996]
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intended to create law and order on reservations,' thus giving
Indians the same rights and privileges enjoyed by non-Indians.
9
In keeping with this purpose, some reservations were specifically
exempted from PL-280 because they already had "reasonably
extent that such State or Territory has jurisdiction over offenses committed
elsewhere within the State or Territory, and the criminal laws of such State or
Territory shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as
they have elsewhere within the State or Territory.
State or Indian country affected
Territory of
Alaska All Indian country within the State, except that on
Annette Islands, the Metlakatla Indian community
may exercise jurisdiction over offenses committed
by Indians in the same manner in which such
jurisdiction may be exercised by Indian tribes in
Indian country over which State jurisdiction has
not been extended.
California All Indian country within the State.
Minnesota All Indian country within the State, except the Red
Lake Reservation.
Nebraska All Indian country within the State.
Oregon All Indian country within the State, except the
Warm Springs Reservation.
Wisconsin All Indian country within the State.
(c) The provisions of sections 1152 and 1153 of this chapter shall not be
applicable within the areas of Indian country listed in subsection (a) of this
section as areas over which the several States have exclusive jurisdiction.
18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994). Civil jurisdiction over certain reservations is conferred by 28
U.S.C. § 1160(a) (1994). "PL-280" as used in this article refers only to criminal
jurisdiction unless otherwise noted.
8. See Bryan v. Itasca County, Minn., 426 U.S. 373, 379-80 (1976); COHEN, supra
note 5, at 364.
One commentator notes that "the foremost concern of Congress at the time of
enacting PL-280 was lawlessness on the reservations and the accompanying threat to
Anglos living nearby." Goldberg, supra note 7, at 541 (citing S. REP. No. 699, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1993)). This fear was the same fear that prompted Congress to pass
the Major Crimes Act. See infra part I.C.1.
Though the same words were articulated by Congress to pass both P.,280 and the
Major Crimes Act, the intent behind the words differed. In 1885, when the Major
Crimes Act was enacted, the Indians were viewed as a lawless people needing to be
placed under law and order. See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text. In 1953,
Congress did not appear to be placing any blame on the Indians themselves. Rather,
three factors were seen as contributing to reservation lawlessness: (1) the patchwork
jurisdiction between the state and federal government over reservation crimes; (2)
federal prosecution was not well-financed or vigorous; and (3) the tribes did not have
ajustice system framework. Goldberg, supra note 7, at 541.
9. RONALD F. FLOWERS, CRIMINALJURISDICTION ALLOCATION IN INDIAN COUNTRY
62 (1983) (citations omitted). There is little legislative history regarding the enactment
of PL-280 to provide insight into the Congressional intent behind the statute. Bryan,
426 U.S. at 379-80.
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satisfactory law-and-order organizations.""
PL-280 gives states the same criminal jurisdiction on
reservations that it has over crimes committed off the reserva-
tions. 1 Perhaps the only distinction between a crime commit-
ted on a PL-280 reservation and a crime committed elsewhere
within the state is that the tribe retains concurrent jurisdiction
to prosecute an Indian defendant.' The federal government's
jurisdiction is no more and no less than the jurisdiction it has
over state lands."
The original version of PL-280 included five mandatory
states, and specific authority for other states, to assume jurisdic-
tion if they chose to do so.14 Originally, tribes had no say in
the process used to transfer jurisdiction from the federal
government to the states.'5 Once states assumed jurisdiction,
tribes experienced either discriminatory practices by law
enforcement or no law enforcement at all. 6 In particular,
10. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 385 n.12 (citations omitted). See also Goldberg, supra note
7, at 542, 542 n.34, 549.
Some tribes are excluded from PL-280 jurisdiction. However, the exclusion does
not apply if the tribal member leaves the boundaries of the reservation. In re Custody
of K.K.S., 508 N.W.2d 813, 815 (Minn. CL App. 1993). Once outside the nonPL-280
reservation boundaries, the tribal member is subject to general state law.
11. See supra note 7 (text of PL-280); see also FLOWERS, supra note 9, at 61.
Despite the transfer of criminal jurisdiction, tribes maintain jurisdiction over
internal domestic relations such as marriages, dissolutions, and custody decisions. See,
e.g., Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation v. Superior CL of Okanogan
County, 945 F.2d 1138, 1140 (9th Cir. 1991); Native Village of Venetie IRA Council v.
Alaska, 918 F.2d 797, 800-04 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing whether the district court has
jurisdiction to hear native village adoption matters), withdrawn and superseded on denial
of reh'g on other grounds, 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1991).
12. Tribal retention of concurrentjurisdiction is premised upon the lack of specific
language in PL-280 abrogating this authority. COHEN, supra note 5, at 367; Goldberg,
supra note 7, at 540-44; see also Native Village of Venetie IRA Council, 918 F.2d at 805 n.9
(noting under PL-280, concurrent jurisdiction exists between the State and the tribe;
whereas before it existed between the federal government and the tribe); Diver v.
Peterson, 524 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Minn. CL App. 1994).
13. COHEN, supra note 5, at 296; MARY BETH WEST, MANUAL OF INDIAN CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION 105 (1977) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1970)).
14. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 477-79
(1993). The original five states were California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and
Wisconsin. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994).
15. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Star. 590; see also GETCHES ET AL., Supra
note 14, at 479; Goldberg, supra note 7, at 544-51.
16. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 14, at 483; Goldberg, supra note 7, at 552 (noting
reservations experienced a range of state law enforcement from very little to none at
all); see also Bryan v. Itasca County, Minn., 426 U.S. 373, 386 n. 12 (1976) (noting several
tribes objected to PL-280 because of a "fear of inequitable treatment of reservation
1996]
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tribes criticized state jurisdiction because non-Indian courts were
unfamiliar with Indian traditions and customs. 17  The states
were also unhappy with PL-280 because they were statutorily
mandated to assume jurisdiction without a corresponding
financial grant from the federal government to cover the
increased burdens on the state's law enforcement, courts, and
18prison system.
PL-280 now includes six specifically enumerated states, with
many other states assuming either partial or total criminal
and/or civil jurisdiction on some reservations. 9 In addition,
PL-280 now permits tribes to have a voice in the process of deter-
mining whether reservation jurisdiction will be transferred from
the federal government to the state.20 The states originally
included in PL-280 also have the ability to return jurisdiction
back to the federal government.
21
If a reservation is not included in PL-280, it is usually
referred to as a non-Public Law 280 (nonPL-280) reservation.
NonPL-280 reservations are the focus of this article. On nonPL-
280 reservations, criminal jurisdiction lies in the tribes and the
Indians in the state courts.").
The Commission on the Rights, Liberties, and Responsibilities of the American
Indian noted: "Under [PL-280] a State can now summarily take this drastic step
[assuming jurisdiction over Indians] without considering the consequences to the
Indians, without providing any safeguards against discrimination which exists in some
places, and without setting any standard for the services to be performed." COMMISSION
ON THE RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN, A PROGRAM
FOR INDIAN CITIZENS 27 (1961) (brackets in original) (as cited and quoted in Goldberg,
supra note 7, at 546 n.54).
17. Goldberg, supra note 7, at 545.
18. Goldberg, supra note 7, at 538, 551-58; see also Bryan, 426 U.S. at 382 (discussing
a legislative debate about whether federal assistance should be given to states who
assume jurisdiction under PL-280); GETCHES ET AL., supra note 14, at 481; COHEN, supra
note 5, at 370.
19. The five original states, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and
Wisconsin, are still included in PL-280. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994). Alaska was added
to PL-280 in 1958. WEST, supra note 13, at 107 n.14. Other new changes in PL-280
permit states to assume jurisdiction over limited offenses. 28 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (1994).
For examples of states who acquired only partial jurisdiction, see WEST, supra note 13,
at 108-11; IDAHO CODE § 67-5101 (1995). Additionally, 25 U.S.C. § 1326, permits a
state to assume jurisdiction over all or just a portion of the reservation. See State v.
Marek, 736 P.2d 1314 (Idaho 1987) (illustrating the confusing result if states assume
only partial criminal jurisdiction over certain crimes).
20. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-26 (1994).
21. See 25 U.S.C. § 1323 (1944); see also Goldberg, supra note 7, at 558; COHEN,
supra note 5, at 370.
[Vol. 22
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federal government.2 2 It is this dual jurisdiction that allowed
the prosecution of physical abuse to fall through the cracks
leaving children unprotected for so long.
B. Tribal Court Jurisdiction on Indian Reservations
The Indian tribe is a unique entity within the boundaries of
the United States. Indian tribes are considered quasi-sovereign
23nations. Tribes retain all powers of a sovereign nation unless
those powers are specifically abrogated by Congress. One of
these inherent powers includes criminal prosecution of certain
persons for crimes committed within the reservation bound-
aries.24  The tribe has jurisdiction to prosecute any crime
committed by an Indian against another person within its
reservation boundaries.2 5  The tribe has no jurisdiction over
crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians26 or crimes
committed by non-Indians against non-Indians.27
The tribe's jurisdiction to prosecute crimes is concurrent
with the federal government's jurisdiction over certain crimes
committed on nonPL-280 reservations.2 1 Concurrent jurisdic-
tion between the tribe and the federal government was chal-
lenged in United States v. Wheeler29  Wheeler was charged in
tribal court with disorderly conduct and contributing to the
delinquency of a minor. He pled guilty to the charged offenses
22. Unless otherwise specified, reservations will hereinafter refer only to nonPL-280
reservations.
23. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1977) (noting "[t]he powers of
Indian tribes are, in general, 'inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never
been extinguished.'" (italics omitted) (quoting FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 122 (1971)).
24. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322; see also Native Village of Venetie IRA Council v. Alaska,
918 F.2d 797, 804-5 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing reservation boundary issues).
25. See Native Vllage of Venetie IRA Counci4 918 F.2d at 805 (citing Montana v.
United States, 950 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)).
26. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978); see A.T.
Skinbine et al., Potential Solutions to Jurisdictional Problems on Reservations, AM. INDIAN J.,
June 1980, at 10 (proposing concurrent jurisdiction between the federal government
and the tribal government over crimes committed by non-Indians on the reservations).
27. Oliphan4 435 U.S. at 208; see also New York ex rel Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496,
499 (1946); Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 247 (1896); United States v.
McBramey, 104 U.S. 621, 622 (1881).
28. The federal government's criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by or
against Indians is derived from two acts, the General Crimes Act and the Major Crimes
Act. See discussion of these two acts infra part I.C.
29. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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and the tribe imposed a sentence.3 0 He was then indicted in
federal court for statutory rape."' Wheeler argued that the
subsequent federal indictment violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the United States Constitution. 2
The Supreme Court rejected Wheeler's argument asserting
a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court
analogized this situation to the ability of both the state and the
federal government to charge a defendant for crimes arising out
of a single behavioral incident.33 Just as the states are sover-
eigns distinct from the United States, so are tribal govern-
ments. 34 Tribes are "'unique aggregations possessing attributes
of sovereignty over both their members and their territory.',
3
The Court recognized that Congress has never eliminated the
tribe's ability to punish its members and has instead "repeatedly
recognized that power and declined to disturb it."36 The Court,
therefore, acknowledged that tribes have concurrentjurisdiction
with the federal government over crimes committed by Indians
within their tribal territories unless and until Congress has
specially provides otherwise.
The process used in tribal criminal justice systems is up to
the tribes, but subject to the limitations of the Indian Civil Rights
Act37 (ICRA). Congress enacted the ICRA purportedly to
strengthen tribal self-governance.38 The Act ensures that
30. Id. at 315. His sentence for the charge of disorderly conduct was 15 days in jail
or a $30 fine. His sentence for the charge of contributing to the delinquency of a
minor was a 60-day jail sentence to be served concurrently with the first sentence, or a
$120 fine. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 316. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides "nor shall any person be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ... U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
33. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 316-17 (reaffirming Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1958)
and Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1958)).
34. Id. at 322. The Court specifically rejected Wheeler's argument that tribes "'owe
their existence and vitality solely to the political department of the federal govern-
ment.'" Id. at 319.
35. Id. at 323 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1974)).
36. Id. at 325.
37. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994); see also FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAw 122, 146-46 (Rennard Strickland ed., 1971).
38. See COHEN, supra note 5, at 661.
Some commentators note that the ICRA was enacted to stop perceived procedural
abuses on the reservations, i.e., deprivation of counsel orjury trial and the right against
self-incrimination. Russel Lawrence Barsh &J. Youngblood Henderson, Tribal Courts,
the Model Code, & The Police Idea In American Indian Policy, 40 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
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Indian defendants in the tribal court system are afforded the
same procedural due process rights as defendants in the federal
court system.3 9 Perhaps the greatest limitation the ICRA places
on tribal courts is the ceiling imposed on the amount of fines
and periods of incarceration. The ICRA places a one-year
ceiling on prison terms and a $5,000 ceiling on fines.' These
limitations on the tribe's penal authority severely affect the
tribe's ability to impose punishments that accurately reflect the
crime committed. Likewise, these limitations are one reason why
concurrent jurisdiction over child physical abuse crimes is
25 (1976). The authors went on to note that these perceived inadequacies stemmed
more from budgetary problems than from attempts to deprive Indian defendants of
their Constitutional rights. Id. at 25-26.
Other commentators characterize the ICRA as another limitation imposed upon
tribal sovereignty and not as a measure designed to increase the self-determination of
Indian tribes. See Ken Peak, CriminalJustice, Law, and Policy in Indian Country: A Historical
Perspective, 17J. CRIM.JUST. 393, 402 (1989).
39. The ICRA provides:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall-
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue
warrants, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;
(5) take any private property for a public use without just compensation;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and
public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be
confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to have assistance of
counsel for his defense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual
punishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any
penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of one year or
a fine of $5,000, or both;
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws
or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law;
(9) pass any bill of attainer or ex post facto law; or
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment
the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994).
40. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1994). The sentencing ceiling was raised in 1986 from
six months to the current one year limitation. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-570, 4217, 100 Stat. 3207-146. Ironically, the change was not an attempt to
increase tribal court autonomy, but rather, it was a part of the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse
Act. One purpose of the Act was to enhance the tribe's ability to prevent and penalize
drug trafficking. Id.
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necessary to ensure the imposition of appropriate punishments.
C. When Does the Federal Government Have Criminal Jurisdiction
on NonPublic Law 280 Reservations?
On nonPL-280 reservations, the federal government's
criminal jurisdiction is dictated by two statutes. The government
has jurisdiction if either the General Crimes Act41 (GCA) or the
Major Crimes Act4 2 (MCA) applies. This paper focuses on the
MCA, but a brief understanding of the GCA is helpful.
The GCA, enacted in 1834, extends general federal
jurisdiction to Indian Country.43  The GCA gives the federal
government the same criminal jurisdiction on nonPL-280
reservations as it has on other federal lands. The GCA extends
all federal criminal law to Indian Country. Conversely, the MCA
provides federal jurisdiction over a limited number of federal
crimes. 4
The GCA contains several limitations that prohibit expansive
federal prosecution of child abuse on reservations. The GCA
does not apply if the crime committed involves one Indian
against another; if the tribe imposed a punishment before
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994) (providing that the general laws of the United States
shall extend to Indian Country).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994) (setting forth the crimes as committed by an Indian
which are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States).
43. The General Crimes Act provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the
United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within
the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of
Columbia, shall extend to the Indian Country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against
the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any
offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local law of the
tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction
over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively.
18 U.S.C. § 1152.
Indian country, as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1152, is defined as:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the
term "Indian country", as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the
limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-
of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities
within the borders of the United States whether within the original or
subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the
limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian tides to which have
not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994).
44. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994) with 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994).
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federal prosecution; or if a treaty specifically maintains exclusive
tribal jurisdiction over the crime. 5
The MCA does not contain the same exclusions and would
appear to provide the federal government with jurisdiction in
some cases where the GCA has taken jurisdiction away. The
MCA gives the federal government jurisdiction over a limited
number of crimes committed on reservations by Indians'
against both Indians and non-Indians. The MCA, however,
covers only the most violent crimes that cannot be adequately
punished in the tribal court system. 7 The MCA provides:
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or
property of another Indian or other person any of the
following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnap-
ping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest, assault
with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous
weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury (as defined
in section 1365 of this title), an assault against an individual
who has not attained the age of 16 years, arson, burglary,
robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within
the Indian country, shall be subject to the same law and
penalties as all other persons committing any of the above
offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this
section that is not defined and punished by Federal law in
force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States
shall be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of
the State in which such offense was committed as are in force
at the time of such offense.'
The MCA is the more specific of the two statutes.49 It
applies to those crimes excluded from the GCA. For example,
the MCA specifically includes Indian versus Indian crimes while
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
46. See St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1458, 1460-65 (D.S.D. 1988)
(discussing the meaning of the term "Indian" in connection to federal jurisdiction).
47. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (discussing ICRA); see also Keeble
v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 211 n.10 (1972) (emphasizing the continuing
congressional intent in amending the Act).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
49. The MCA can be said to be more specific than the GCA based upon the
language of the statutes. The GCA begins "Except as otherwise expressly provided by
law .... " 18 U.S.C. § 1152. The next statutory provision is the MCA which expressly
provides jurisdiction to the federal government that the GCA excludes. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1153; see also COHEN, supra note 5, at 301.
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the GCA explicitly excludes this class of crimes.' Also, the
MCA does not exclude federal prosecution when the tribe has
already imposed a punishment. The absence of this language
permits concurrentjurisdiction between the federal government
and the tribe over the enumerated MCA crimes."' The provi-
sions and limited applicability of the MCA are the focus of this
paper.
1. The Development of the Major Crimes Act
The MCA was enacted in response to the United States
Supreme Court decision in Ex parte Crow Dog 2 In Crow Dog,
50. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152; 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
51. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1152 with 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
There seems to be some on-going debate among commentators as to whether tribes
are divested of criminal jurisdiction when the federal government acts under the MCA.
Compare Wilcomb E. Washburn, The Historical Context of American Indian Legal Problems,
40 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 12, 21 n.28 (1976) and FLOWERS, supra note 9, at 64-65
(discussing Iron Crow v. Oglaula Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956), where court
concluded that sovereignty is absolute if not taken away by the United States) and
Dussias, supra note 2, at 21, 24 (stating that "tribes have consistently been recognized
as retaining criminal jurisdiction over tribal members") with Douglas B. Cubberley,
Criminal Jurisdiction Over Nonmember Indians: The Legal Void After Duro v. Reina, 16 AM.
INDIAN L. REv. 213, 225-26 (1991) (discussing Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 569
(1883), where the Court stated that Indian tribes have a "dependent status as ward of
the United States which thus justifies intrusion into the internal powers of the tribe.").
Any debate over this issue is curious in light of the MCA's legislative history. When the
MCA was originally proposed in 1885, the language read:
[A]ll Indians... shall be subject therefor to the laws of such Territory relating
to said crimes, and shall be tried therefor in the same courts and in the same
manner and not otherwise and shall be subject to the same penalties as are all
other persons charged with the commission of said crimes respectively.
16 CONG. REc. 934, 935 (1884) (emphasis added). The "and not otherwise" language
was deliberately deleted to ensure tribal jurisdiction was not divested but remained
concurrent with federal jurisdiction. Id. at 934. Congressional intent to maintain
concurrentjurisdiction was repeated when sexual molestation of a minor was added to
the MCA. Sexual Molestation of a Minor in Indian Country Act, Pub. L. No. 99-303,
1986 U.S.C.CAN. (99 Stat.) 1298, 1301. No question about the tribe's ability to
prosecute crimes listed in the MCA should exist in light of this legislative history.
52. 109 U.S. 556 (1883). Crow Dog was prosecuted and convicted in South Dakota
territorial court for the murder of Spotted Tail and sentenced to death. Id. at 557.
Crow Dog had already been tried and convicted under the laws of the tribe and ordered
to pay restitution to the victim's family. Peak, supra note 38, at 398.
The federal prosecution of Crow Dog resulted from the outcry over the tribe's
imposition of a sentence of retribution. PETRA T. SHATTUCK &JILL NORGREN, PARTIAL
JUSTICE: FEDERAL INDIAN LAW IN A LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 92 (1991). Some
commentators now suggest that the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) was actually behind
the call for federal prosecution. Id. at 106 n.49. The BIA, it is argued, wanted to
assume criminal jurisdiction in the hopes of increasing the speed of assimilation. Id.
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the Court held that federal courts had no jurisdiction over
crimes committed by Indians on reservations." The Court
interpreted the treaties between the Sioux Indians and the
United States to preserve the tribe's right to self-governance
which included the right to exercise criminal jurisdiction."
The Court noted that while Congress had the power to extend
federal jurisdiction to crimes on reservations, it had not exer-
cised this power.55 Absent expressed Congressional intent to
intrude upon tribal sovereignty, the Court would not grant the
federal government criminal jurisdiction on reservations.56
In swift and direct response to Crow Dog, Congress passed
the MCA in 1885.57 Congress clearly intended to nullify the
decision in Crow Dog. The MCA was proposed as an amendment
to an appropriations bill and it passed the same day it was
proposed.58 A congressional perception of "lawlessness" on the
reservations and a need to "civilize" Indians 9 were the main
forces behind the amendment.' Comments during the floor
53. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 572.
54. Id. at 567.
55. Id. at 572.
56. See id.; see also COHEN, supra note 5, at 282.
57. See Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 385 (1885) (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1153); see also United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383 (1886) (noting that the law
was designed to end the jurisdictional problem and to make a crime by one Indian
upon another Indian punishable by the state in which the reservation exists).
58. 16 CONG. REC. 934 (1885). Some congressmen wanted the bill to go to the
Committee on Indian Affairs because of the extensive debate occurring on the floor.
Id. at 935. This suggestion was rejected because passing the bill to committee would
defeat its passage for yet another session. Id. at 935-36. A similar bill was defeated
during the prior session because it sought to punish misdemeanor crimes as well as
felonies. Id. at 935.
59. One congressman argued that imposing criminal penalties upon the Indians
was contrary to the principle that the tribes need protection. Representative Hiscock
argued:
[B] ut when we bring in a bill here year after year appropriating many millions
of dollars to support and care for these Indians, and treat them as irresponsi-
ble persons, it seems to me that policy is not in the policy indicated by this
amendment, which proposes to extend to them the harsh provisions of the
criminal law.
16 CONG. REC. 936 (1885); see also Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 571 (noting the inequities of
imposing criminal law on Indians).
60. Representative Cutcheon noted, "I do not believe we shall ever succeed in
civilizing the Indian race until we teach them regard for law, and show them that they
are not only responsible to the law, but amenable to its penalties." 16 CONG. REC. 934
(1885).
During the debates, it was also argued by Representative Budd that:
This provision is as much for the benefit of the Indians as it is for the whites;
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debate indicate congressmen were outraged that Indians were
committing murder on the reservations and were not being
punished in a manner they considered appropriate. 61 Accord-
ing to Congress, tribal punishments62 were "either nonexistent
or incompatible with principles that Congress thought should be
controlling."63 Congress believed that subjecting Indians to
federal criminal jurisdiction would speed up Indian "civilization"
by teaching them respect for life and property.' The MCA
because now, as there is no law to punish for Indian depredations, the
bordermen take the law into their own hands, which would not be the case if
such provision as this was enacted into law.
Id. at 936.
61. Representative Cutcheon argued, with respect to the tribal punishment, that:
It is an infamy upon our civilization, a disgrace to this nation, that there
should be anywhere within its boundaries a body of people who can, with
absolute impunity, commit the crime of murder, there being no tribunal
before which they can be brought for punishment. Under our present law
there is no penalty that can be inflicted except according to the custom of the
tribe, which is simply that the "blood-avenger"-that is, the next of kin to the
person murdered-shall pursue the one who has been guilty of the crime and
commit a new murder upon him.
... If, however, an Indian commits a crime against an Indian on an
Indian reservation there is now no law to punish the offense except, as I have
said, the law of the tribe, which is just no law at all.
16 CONG. REc. 934 (1885).
Some commentators reject the idea that the MCA was enacted simply to ensure
Indian perpetrators are punished in an "American" manner. They suggest instead,
"Congress' action was more to suppress tribal criminal law than to provide punishment
where there had been none." Barsh & Henderson, supra note 38, at 40; see also
Cubberley, supra note 51, at 225 n.74.
62. For examples of tribal punishments see COHEN, supra note 5, at 335. Cohen
describes tribal punishments which included ostracism, group disapproval, ridicule,
religious controls, and denial of privileges. See also WILLIAM T. HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE
AND JUDGES: EXPERIMENTS IN ACCULTURATION & CONTROL 14-19 (1966).
If the American system of justice had not been imposed on the Indians, the
problems addressed in this article may not exist. Prior to the enactment of the MCA,
tribal justice was "swift and sure." Peak, supra note 38, at 398. Peak indicates that tribal
punishments ranged from ridicule and scorn to flogging and clubbing. Id. While these
punishments might be considered archaic by non-Indians, the force of the traditional
punishments and the associated shaming effect had a stronger impact of deterrence and
punishment than imprisonment could ever hope to have. Cf id. at 405 (noting that
traditional European notions of punishment, particularly incarceration, carry no stigma
for Indians); COHEN, supra note 5, at 335.
63. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 210 (1973). The Secretary of the
Interior, in his annual report to Congress, clearly did not view Indian punishment as
a form of punishment at all when he noted, "If offenses of this character can not be
tried in the courts of the United States, there is no tribunal in which the crime of
murder can be punished." 16 CONG. REC. 934, 935 (1885).
64. See 16 CONG. REC. 936 (1885); Keeble 412 U.S. at 211-12; see aLso Peak, supra
note 38, at 402.
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passed sixty-eight to two' and extended federal criminal
jurisdiction to seven crimes on the reservations. 66 Over the
intervening years, the number of crimes included in the MCA
has risen to seventeen.67
2. The Constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act
The constitutionality of the MCA was challenged not long
after its passage in United States v. Kagama. In Kagama, an
Indian defendant was indicted in federal court for the murder
of another Indian on the Hoopa Valley Indian reservation in
California.69 On appeal, Kagama argued that criminal jurisdic-
tion on the reservations was outside the authority of the United
States.7' The United States Supreme Court upheld the indict-
ment, relying upon the established principle that the United
States has plenary authority over Indians residing within its
territories. 7' The Court noted that the decision in Crow Dog was
based only on Congress' failure to specifically provide for federal
jurisdiction over reservation crimes, and that the MCA provided
the Congressional grant of authority found lacking in Crow
Dog.72 The Court viewed criminal jurisdiction on the reserva-
tions as consistent with tribes' status as a "ward," dependent
upon the United States for protection and the basic essentials of
life.
73
The constitutionality of the MCA was again challenged over
65. 16 CONG. REc. 936 (1885).
66. The original seven crimes were murder, manslaughter, assault with intent to
commit murder, arson, burglary, rape, and larceny. Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, 23 Stat.
362 (1885) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1153).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994) (including murder, manslaughter, kidnapping,
maiming, sexual assault as defined in chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit
murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury,
assault against an individual who has not attained the age of sixteen years, arson,
burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of title 18).
68. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
69. Id. at 375.
70. Id. at 376.
71. Id. at 381.
72. Id. at 383.
73. Id. at 383-84. The Court also rejected the argument for state criminal
jurisdiction on the reservations. It noted that the states were often Indians' "deadliest
enemies," and because the Indians' weakened status was due to its relationship with the
United States, it was the United States' responsibility to act as the Indians' protector.
Id. at 384.
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a hundred years later in United States v. Antelope.74 Antelope was
convicted of felony murder for the death of a non-Indian on the
Coeur d'Alene reservation.75  Antelope appealed his convic-
tion, arguing that but for his race as an Indian he would have
been charged in state court where the elements for proving
murder are more onerous.7 ' He argued that the MCA repre-
sented invidious racial discrimination in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 7
The Court rejected Antelope's claims on two grounds. First,
the Court pointed to constitutional authorization for specific
classification of Indians by race in the United States Constitu-
tion.7s Second, the Court noted that criminal jurisdiction over
Indians is based, not on race, but upon the Indian defendant's
membership in a quasi-sovereign nation. 79 Antelope was subject
to federal jurisdiction, not because he was Indian per se, but
because he was an enrolled member of the Coeur d'Alene
Tribe. 0 The Court also rejected Antelope's Equal Protection
argument, noting Indian defendants are given the same constitu-
tional protection as other defendants charged in federal courts
with the same crime.81 The MCA is a constitutional and viable
source of federal prosecution authority.
74. 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
75. Id. at 642-43.
76. Id. at 644. The defendant was charged with the federal crime of felony
murder. The criminal code of Idaho does not contain felony murder, only murder.
Id. Consequently, the prosecution in state court would have had to prove premeditation
and deliberation. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 645. The Court pointed to Article I, § 8 of the United States Constitution
which provides, "To regulate Commerce with.., the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8.
79. Antelope, 430 U.S. at 645-46. The Court derived this conclusion by considering
Fischer v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976), which dealt with a claim of racial
discrimination based on the exclusion of Northern Cheyenne Tribe members from
Montana state courts in adoption matters, and the reasoning found in Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), which involved a challenge by a non-Indian to the Indian
hiring preference of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. In both cases, the charges of
discrimination were rejected. See Antelope, 430 U.S. at 645-46.
80. Anteope, 430 U.S. at 646.
81. Id. at 647-48. The Court also noted that a mere difference between the
elements of federal crimes and state crimes does not amount to a constitutional
violation provided the law is applied in an even-handed manner. Id. at 649.
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III. THE MAJOR CRIMES ACT-PAST AND PRESENT
Tribes do not aggressively prosecute physical abuse against
children.82 These crimes need to be stopped for the sake of
the child as well as the tribe.83 Crimes against children are of
the lowest level because children are absolutely vulnerable. If
tribes used their own laws to charge and punish abusers, federal
intervention perhaps would be unnecessary.84 Abusers would
82. Discussions with tribal law enforcement officials on one Indian reservation
indicate that most physical abuse crimes are not prosecuted. These sources expressed
their frustration at investigating child abuse and watching as the tribal authorities take
no criminal action. To protect individual identities, their names, locations, and
positions will not be revealed.
Cases reported in the Indian Law Reporter from 1988-1993 indirectly support the
assertion that physical abuse is rarely prosecuted on the reservations. The majority of
the criminal cases involved alcohol-related offenses, disorderly conduct, and election
violations. The only criminal cases relating to children involved sexual abuse. Physical
abuse cases were noticeably absent. See Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v.
Poitra, 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6119 (1991) (indecent
liberties with child and disorderly conduct); Colville Confederated Tribes v. Bush, 18
Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6123 (1990) (indecent liberties
with a ten-year-old child, adopting Washington rules for competency and hearsay);
Colville Confederated Tribes v. Thomas, 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training
Program) 6126 (1990) (rape); see also Howard v. Navajo Bd of Election Supervisors, 18
Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6064 (1991) (no person convicted
of a misdemeanor involving the welfare of children, child abuse, or child neglect can
be a council delegate); Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa v. McGillis, 18 Indian L.
Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6128 (1990) (defendant charged with
contributing to the delinquency of a minor for allowing son to attack another child who
suffered injuries).
83. See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
84. Tribal laws often include assault statutes that could be used to prosecute
physical child abuse on the reservations. For example, the Red Lake Indian Tribal
Code provides:
Subdivision. 1. First Degree Assault. First degree assault is an act done with
intent to cause fear in another person of immediate bodily harm or death or
the intentional infliction of or attempt to inflict bodily harm upon another
without causing any actual bodily harm. First degree assault is a petty
misdemeanor.
Subdivision. 2. Second Degree Assault. Any Indian who intentionally causes
bodily injury to another or recklessly or negligently causes bodily injury to
another or attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of serious
bodily harm is guilty of second degree assault. Second degree assault is a
misdemeanor.
Subdivision. 3. Third Degree Aggravated Assault. Any Indian who intentionally
causes serious bodily injury to another or intentionally causes bodily injury to
another with a deadly weapon or recklessly causes serious bodily injury to
another under circumstances manifesting indifference to the value of human
life is guilty of third degree aggravated assault. Any Indian who commits a
first or second degree simple assault with a deadly weapon is guilty of third
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learn that physical violence against children is unacceptable
behavior, and thus through societal forces, physical abuse would
diminish. Federal involvement would then be necessary only
when a sentence greater than one year of incarceration was
warranted.' Unfortunately, these are not the circumstances
facing Indian children. The tribes do not prosecute those who
commit these crimes, and until recently, the federal government
could not adequately protect children because of the limited
number of crimes included in the MCA.
In 1994, however, the legislature amended the MCA and
included a specific provision for assaults against children. 6 This
Amendment was desperately needed in the battle to protect
children from abuse. The Amendment was expansive because
it gave the federal government authority over minor crimes
unlike it had ever had before. Unfortunately, the Amendment's
broad range is in direct conflict with the historical development
of the MCA and tribal sovereignty. The circumstances existing
before the Amendment as compared to the circumstances after
the Amendment must be examined to understand how the 1994
Amendment overextends the purpose of the MCA and the role
of federal jurisdiction on the reservation.
A. The Status of Physically Abused Indian Children Before the 1994
Amendment
As mentioned above, the federal government's ability to
prosecute child physical abuse crimes on Indian reservations is
limited to the GCA and the MCA. If the crime involved an
Indian against a non-Indian child, the government's prosecution
ability was not as severely limited because the GCA could be used
to prosecute the perpetrator.8 7 The full extent of federal laws
and state laws, if necessary, were viable options to prosecute
degree aggravated assault. Aggravated assault is a gross misdemeanor.
RED LAKE BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS, TRIBAL CODE § 502.01.
Even if the tribe prosecuted the crime of physical child abuse, the ICRA would still
limit the tribe's ability to incarcerate the offender. See supra notes 39-40 and
accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (discussing limitations of the
ICRA).
86. See infra notes 134-37 (setting forth the revised statute).
87. See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text (discussing limitations of the GCA
and MCA).
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child abuse in cases of Indian against non-Indian abuse.,
The problem arose when the physical abuse was committed
by an Indian against an Indian child. In this scenario, the MCA
provided the only avenue for federal prosecution. 9 Only three
of the sixteen crimes included in the pre-1994 MCA were viable
charging options in cases of nonfatal child abuse.' These
options were assault with a dangerous weapon,91 assault result-
ing in serious bodily injury,92 and maiming.9" Of these three
crimes, only the two assault statutes94 regularly applied in child
88. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994) (laws governing Indian country); 18 U.S.C. § 13(a)
(1994) (adopting state laws in areas of federal jurisdiction).
89. See infra appendix and notes 199-204.
90. Abuse resulting in the death of a child can be prosecuted under the MCA. 18
U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1994) (listing the crimes of murder and manslaughter).
91. The Ninth Circuit Jury Instructions provide that Assault with a Dangerous
Weapon results when the defendant "intentionally [struck or wounded __ ] [or]
[used a display of force that reasonably caused - to fear immediate bodily harm];"
acted with specific intent; and used an instrument. MANUAL OF MODEL INSTRUCTIONS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT § 8.02D (Comm. on Model Jury Instructions 1995). The
instruction goes on to state that the instrument "is a dangerous weapon if it is used in
a way that is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." Id.
92. The Ninth CircuitJury Instructions provide that Assault Resulting in Serious
Bodily Injury resulted when "the defendant intentionally [struck] [wounded] _ ;
and ... , as a result, _ suffered serious bodily injury." MANUAL OF MODEL
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT § 8.02F (Comm. on Model Jury Instructions
1995). The factors the jury should use to determine if the victim suffered serious bodily
injury include "whether the victim suffered extreme physical pain, protracted and
obvious disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily
member, organ, or mental faculty, protracted unconsciousness, and significant or
substantial internal damage (such as important broken bones)." United States v.
Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1246 (9th Cir. 1980).
93. Maiming is defined at Title 18, United States Code § 114 and provides:
Whoever, within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States and with intent to maim or disfigure, cuts, bites, or slits the nose, ear,
or lip, or cuts out or disables the tongue, or puts out or destroys an eye, or
cuts off or disables a limb or any member of another person; or... throws or
pours upon another person, any scalding water, corrosive acid, or caustic
substance ....
18 U.S.C. § 114 (1994).
94. The crime of assault is set out at Title 18, United States Code § 113. It
provides in relevant part:
(a) Whoever, within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, is guilty of an assault shall be punished as follows:
(3) Assault with a dangerous weapon, with intent to do bodily harm, and
without just cause or excuse, by fine under this title or imprisonment for
not more than ten years, or both.
(6) Assault resulting in serious bodily injury, by a fine under this title or
imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both.
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abuse cases. The third, maiming, requires proof of the
defendant's intent to maim which may be difficult to prove in a
child abuse case. The definitions of these three crimes were too
narrow to apply to most physical abuse crimes. Many cases did
not involve a dangerous weapon or bodily harm that rose to the
level of serious bodily injury. Consequently, many Indian
children were left unprotected as a result of the tribe's failure to
vigorously prosecute the crimes against them and the federal
government's inability to do so.
1. Children on NonPL-280 Reservations Were Not
Protected Like Other Similarly Situated Children
Prior to the 1994 Amendment, differences in the treatment
of physically abused Indian children living on nonPL-280
reservation were evident at multiple levels. The physically
abused child received less statutory protection than the sexually
abused child. The physically abused child on the reservation was
less protected than a child living off the reservation. Even
children who were similarly abused within the same reservation
were protected differently depending on their race and the race
of their abuser. In sum, physically abused Indian children were
discriminated against on the grounds of their race and their
domicile.95
Physically abused children on nonPL-280 reservations had
inadequate statutory protection as compared to sexually abused
children. Sexually abused children are specifically protected
under federal law. 6 In 1986, the legislature amended the MCA
18 U.S.C. § 113 (1994).
Serious bodily injury is defined as:
[Blodily injury which involves-(A) a substantial risk of death; (B) extreme
physical pain; (C) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or (D) protracted
loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental
faculty.
18 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 113(b) (1994).
95. See, e.g., Sexual Molestation of a Minor in Indian Country Act, Pub. L. No. 99-
303, 1986 U.S.C.CAN. (99 Stat.) 1298, 1299 (stating that "'Indian children residing on
reservations are not accorded the same protections as other American children'")
(quoting Testimony of the Navajo Nation Before the House Committe on the Judiciay
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice on H.R 3826, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1986)).
96. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (1994) (aggravated sexual
abuse with children); 18 U.S.C. § 2243 (1994) (sexual abuse of a minor or ward); 18
U.S.C. § 2244 (1994) (abusive sexual contact).
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to specifically include sex crimes against children. 7  The
Amendment arose from a realization that sexual abuse was
prevalent on the reservations and federal intervention was
necessary to protect the children. 8 Physically abused children,
however, needed the same protection, but their needs were
ignored.
Nojustification for the different levels of protection between
the types of abuse exists. The differences cannot be based on
different degrees of harm. Physically abused children, like
sexually abused children, suffer psychological harm from the
abuse." The physically abused child is at greater physical risk
than the sexually abused child because of the potential for
permanent scarring and the possibility of death."° Physically
abused children should have received the same protection as
sexually abused children.
The Indian child beaten by another Indian was also
protected differently than the non-Indian child beaten by the
same person in the same location. For example, assume Joe, a
97. Sexual Molestation of a Minor in Indian Country Act, Pub. L. No. 99-303, 1986
U.S.C.CAN. (99 Stat) 1298. This Amendment added the crime of "felonious sexual
molestation of a minor." Id. The legislature later struck this crime, as well as the
crimes of rape (originally added by Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, 23 Star. 385 (1885));
carnal knowledge and assault with intent to commit rape (originally added by Criminal
Offenses-Indian Country, Pub. L. No. 89-707, 80 Stat. 1100-01 (1966)); and
involuntary sodomy (originally added by Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Star. 1837), to include the language "a felony under chapter
109A." See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994). Chapter 109A of Title 18 in the United States
Code contains all sex crimes. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241-48 (1993). See supra note 97 (listing
the sex crime titles).
98. Sexual Molestation of a Minor in Indian Country Act, Pub. L. No. 99-303,1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. (99 Stat.) 1298, 1305. Nancy Tuthil of the Indian Law Center stated "the
inability of tribes to effectively combat the problem of child sexual abuse has reached
crisis proportions and my primary concern is for an immediate vehicle for prosecution
of child sexual offenders." Id.
99. DANIEL L. KERNs, M.D., THE PEDIATRIC PERSPECTIVE IN FOUNDATIONS OF CHILD
ADVOCACY 23 (Donald C. Bross & Laura Freeman Michaels eds., 1987). Dr. Kerns
notes:
While physical and sexual abuse are the most blatant [forms of abuse],
emotional abuse and the many varied forms of neglect may ultimately be as
harmful. Indeed, short of maiming or killing a child, physical abuse takes its
developmental and psychological toll through the implicit emotional neglect
and abuse accompanying the physical act... .With each physical attack comes
a message of badness, worthlessness and unlovability.
Id. at 25.
100. See KERNs, supra note 99, at 27-31 (discussing various physical injuries that may
result from physical abuse).
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member of the Sioux tribe, lives with his non-Indian girlfriend,
Sue, on a nonPL-280 reservation. Joe has a child, Billy, from a
previous relationship. Sue has a non-Indian child, Becky, from
a previous relationship. Joe assaults both children on multiple
occasions with a belt that has a large metal buckle. Each child
suffers multiple bruises and lacerations. Further, assume that
the tribe fails to prosecute Joe.
The federal government must act, if at all, under the GCA
or the MCA. In Billy's case, the government could have acted
only under the MCA because it was an Indian against Indian
crime."' The only pre-1994 charging option was assault result-
ing in serious bodily injury.1 12 Thus, the government had to
show that the beating caused extreme physical pain or that the
beating caused a protracted and obvious disfigurement.
10 3
While a case built on these facts had some potential for success
given the ability to argue extreme physical pain, charging was
unlikely given the high burden created by the definition of
serious bodily injury. Thus, the crime against Billy would have
likely gone unvindicated.
Conversely, in the case ofJoe against Becky, the government
could have proceeded pursuant to either the GCA or the
MCA. 10 4 The case could have been prosecuted under the
general assault statutes of the United States.0 5 The prosecutor
would also have had the option of looking to state law if he or
she did not believe the federal assault statutes provided a proper
charging avenue.106 Unlike the crime against Billy, the crime
against Becky could have been successfully prosecuted. Billy was
101. See infra appendix.
102. See infra note 135 for a definition of assault resulting in serious bodily injury.
103. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 113(b)(2) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 1365
(1994).
104. See infra appendix.
105. See 18 U.S.C. § 113.
106. The ability of the prosecutor to look to state law to charge a defendant with a
federal crime is premised on the Assimilated Crimes Act. The Assimilated Crimes Act
provides:
Whoever within or upon any of the places now existing or hereafter reserved
or acquired as provided in section 7 of this title, is guilty of any act or
omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress,
would be punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the
State, Territory, Possession, or District in which such place is situated, by the
laws thereof in force at the time of such act or omission, shall be guilty of a
like offense and subject to a like punishment.
18 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994).
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less. protected simply by virtue of his Indian race."0 7 It is
difficult to justify this very different result given the similar harm
suffered by both children.
The inequity of the protection given physically abused
children on nonPL-280 reservations can also be seen by compar-
ing the protection afforded nonPL-280 Indian children to that
afforded other children, both Indian and non-Indian, who did
not live on the reservation.108 A fictional example located in
Minnesota helps to illustrate this point. Minnesota is a PL-280
state, but the Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians is excluded
from PL-280 classification.10 9 Johnny Smith's father beat him
on multiple occasions with a belt that left numerous bruises and
lacerations on his back which resulted in lateral scars. The
Smiths lived in Island Lake, a small town located just off the Red
Lake Reservation. Another child, SuzyJohnson, was beat by her
mother on multiple occasions with an electrical cord leaving
bruises and lacerations on her thighs and buttocks. Suzy has
loop-shaped scars on her back from the beatings. The Johnsons
are Indians and live on the Leech Lake Reservation.110 Both
Smith andJohnson could have been charged under Minnesota's
Malicious Punishment of a Child statute.11 The crimes against
Johnny and Suzy would have been appropriately charged and the
offenders properly prosecuted.
Now consider a case involving Timmy Barrett who lived on
107. The same argument was used when Congress amended the MCA to include
maiming. The federal government's inability to prosecute maiming was viewed as
enforcement discrimination against Indian victims who were left to find vindication only
in the tribal courts while non-Indians victimized on federal lands could find redress in
the federal courts. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984
U.S.C.CAN. (98 Star.) 3182, 3498 n.4.
108. Cf. Sexual Molestation of a Minor in Indian Country Act, Pub. L. No. 99-303,
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (99 Star.) 1298, 1298-99 (noting "'Indian children residing on
reservations are not accorded the same protections as other American children.'")
(quoting Testimony of the Navajo Nation Before the House Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice on H.R. 3826, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986)).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1994) (providing Minnesota with state jurisdiction over
"[a]ll Indian Country within the State, except the Red Lake Reservation.").
110. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 14, at 2-3 (providing a map of Indian
reservations in the United States).
111. See MINN. STAT. § 609.377 (1994); see, e.g., State v. Williams, 451 N.W.2d 886,
888 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming conviction for substantial bodily harm where
injuries included horseshoe shaped scars from blows from a belt buckle, loop marks
consistent with the child being whipped by a cord, circular scars consistent with
cigarette burns and multiple linear scars).
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the Red Lake Indian Reservation. Timmy's father, Martin, beat
him on multiple occasions with a belt which left bruises and
lacerations on his legs and back, leaving scars. Timmy and his
father were members of the Chippewa Tribe. The tribal
prosecutor declined prosecution. The only source of federal
jurisdiction was the MCA because this was an Indian versus
Indian crime.
n2
The three potential MCA crimes did not fit this fact pattern.
Maiming cannot be used here because it was unlikely that any
permanent disfigurement would have resulted or that Martin
intended to maim or disfigure Timmy."' Perhaps the belt
could have been classified as a deadly weapon when used against
a child, but it was unlikely. The only charging option left was
assault resulting in serious bodily injury. However, these facts
would likely have extended the meaning of "serious bodily
injury" to its outer limits."' Thus, the prosecutor may not
have sought an indictment and Martin would have been free to
continue assaulting Timmy.
The only difference between Johnny, Suzy, and Timmy was
that Timmy's home was on the Red Lake Reservation. This
difference hardly justified the different responses to very similar
circumstances. Children of every race, in every location, deserve
to be protected from those who prey upon them. The differing
levels of protection that existed prior to 1994 did not live up to
this truism.
2. The Lack of an Assault of a Child Statute Created the
Potential for Charging Abuses by Prosecutors
Charging abuses were possible given the lack of an assault
statute to apply to child physical abuse cases in the pre-1994
MCA. Prosecutors may have been tempted to over-charge a
defendant because of the potential for a lesser included offense
jury instruction." 5 If a prosecutor wanted to see a defendant
charged, she may have been inclined to seek and receive an
indictment for a crime listed in the MCA, knowing the defen-
112. See infra appendix.
113. See supra note 94 for definition of maiming.
114. See infra note 134 for definition of serious bodily injury.
115. See Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1978) (noting that with a
lesser included offense jury instruction, a simple assault instruction could be given if
requested).
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dant may ask for a lesser included assault jury instruction.
Until about twenty years ago, district courts refused to give
lesser included offense instructions when the MCA was involved,
believing it was the tribe's responsibility to prosecute the lesser
included crimes.16 The United States Supreme Court rejected
this premise in Keeble v. United States.17 Relying on the lan-
guage of Title 18, United States Code Section 3242, which states
that Indians who commit crimes shall be tried "in the same
manner" as all others, the Supreme Court held that Indian
defendants are entitled to lesser included offense instruc-
tions."' Although recognizing the MCA's original purpose was
to "civilize" Indians, the Court held it was not meant to deprive
Indian defendants of the procedural rights afforded to non-
Indian defendants.119 The Court concluded that no tribal
interest was threatened by affording an Indian defendant the
right to a lesser included offense instruction.
1 20
With the possibility of lesser included offense instructions,
prosecutors might be tempted to pursue a case knowing one of
the MCA crimes could not be proven, but knowing the lesser
included offense of simple assault could be proven.
1 21
Although the Supreme Court recognized this as a potential
problem, this concern did not alter its decision. 122 Prosecutors
and law enforcement officials, tired of seeing children repeatedly
abused, may have pursued cases simply because something had
to be done.
3. The Pre-1994 Major Crimes Act Failed to Include a
Penal Title and Punishment That Paralleled the Crime
Committed
The thirteen crimes in the pre-1994 MCA did not adequate-
116. Id. at 209.
117. Id. at 212.
118. Id. Title Eighteen, United States Code § 3242 provides:
All Indians committing any offense listed in the first paragraph of and
punishable under Section 1153 (relating to offenses committed within Indian
country) of this title shall be tried in the same courts and in the same manner
as are all other persons committing such offense within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 3242 (1994).
119. Keeb/e, 412 U.S. at 211-12.
120. Id. at 214.
121. COHEN, supra note 5, at 303.
122. Keeble, 412 U.S. at 214 n.14; see alo WEST, supra note 13, at 46 n.30, 48.
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ly encompass the crime of physical abuse. 2  The crime of
child abuse involves not only physical harm, but also emotional
trauma, a violation of trust and innocence, and the offender's
dereliction of his or her obligation to care for and protect
children.' 24  Crimes against children are different in nature
than crimes against adults, and consequently, should be appro-
priately labeled to reflect the crime committed.
Specific examples best demonstrate the inadequacy of the
pre-1994 MCA. Consider the case of a three-year-old girl whose
arms and legs are fractured. She has multiple cigarette burns
and bruises over her entire body.125  Federal authorities did
not prosecute because the "absence of a [federal child neglect]
statute create [d] a substantial void in [the federal government's]
effort to protect children who reside in reservation communi-
ties."126 This crime occurred, however, before the assault
resulting in serious bodily injury statute was enacted. Today, this
statute can be used, and the lack of a specific physical abuse
statute will not seriously jeopardize federal prosecution in this
type of case.
127
In contrast, consider the case of four-year-old Sara whose
mother burned her legs with a cigarette at least twelve times.128
Tribal authorities refused to prosecute and the case was referred
to the United States Attorneys' Office. The defendant was
indicted for assault with a deadly weapon and assault resulting in
serious bodily injury.129  Sara's mother was convicted on both
counts. This crime was justly prosecuted. Yet, a question
123. This same reasoning was used to amend the MCA to include maiming.
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 99-473, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98
Stat) 3182, 3498. The Committee felt that, although the crime could be punished as
assault resulting in serious bodily injury, the Amendment would allow prosecution of
a more serious and specific offense, rather than just the general crime of assault. Id.
at 3499; see supra note 93 for the definition of maiming.
124. See generally A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: PRESIDENT'S CHILD SAFETY PARTNER-
SHIP 7 (1987).
125. The facts for this example are drawn from an investigation file and a citation
is unavailable.
126. An additional factor in the government's decision not to prosecute was the
inability to determine which foster parent was the perpetrator.
127. 18 U.S.C. § 113(b)(2) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (3) (1994).
128. The facts for this example are taken from United States v. Barrett, 8 F.3d 1296,
1297-98 (8th Cir. 1993). The conviction in this case was reversed on evidentiary
grounds. Id. at 1301.
129. Id.
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remained as to whether there was an appropriate fit between the
charged crimes and the nature of the offense. The tenuous
nature of the fit was particularly evident in the charge of assault
with a dangerous weapon. A specific assault against a child
statute, or a lesser degree of assault, would have more appropri-
ately addressed the crime committed.
B. Assault Against a Child Statute
31
An amendment to the MCA in some form was necessary to
effectively protect physically abused children. The needed
protection arrived in 1994 when the Legislature amended the
MCA to include an assault committed against a person under the
age of sixteen. 13  The Amendment was a victory for children.
It provides Indian children with the expansive protection they
have never had before. In giving children this expansive
protection, however, the Legislature overlooked the tribe's right
to self-governance and the original legislative intent behind the
MCA. Hence, the Legislature must now decide if it will focus
only on Indian children's best interests or if it will act in
conformity with the century old philosophy behind the MCA and
limit federal criminal jurisdiction on reservations.
The 1994 Amendment significantly broadened the scope
of the federal government's ability to prosecute physical abuse.
As set out above, the government's pre-1994 charging options
included assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in
serious bodily injury, and maiming."12 The 1994 Amendment,
however, permits the government to prosecute any type of
assault against a child. 3' According to the United States Code,
"assault" includes the following:
(1) Assault with intent to commit murder,
(2) Assault with intent to commit any felony, except murder
or a felony under chapter 109A [sexual assault statutes],
(3) Assault with a dangerous weapon, with intent to do
bodily harm, and without just cause or excuse, by fine under
this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or
130. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 170201(e), 108 Stat. 2042, 2043 (Tide XVII, Subtitle B of the Act addresses assaults
against children).
131. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1994).
132. 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
133. Id.
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both.
(4) Assault by striking, beating, or wounding,
(5) Simple assault,
(6) Assault resulting in serious bodily injury,"s and
(7) Assault resulting in substantial bodily injury"'5 to an
individual who has not attained the age of sixteen years. 
1 6
The Legislature also made substantive changes to the assault
statute. Prior to the 1994 Amendment, the assault statute
contained set penalties for assaults, regardless of the victim's age.
The 1994 Legislature provided an enhanced penalty for the
crime of simple assault if the victim was under the age of
sixteen.13 7  Furthermore, the Legislature added an "assault
resulting in substantial injury to a child under the age of sixteen"
provision."' The significant breath of the statute creates
conflict with the tribe's right to self-governance and the original
purpose behind the MCA.
1. Problems with the 1994 Amendment
A federal statutory change was necessary to protect children
from physical abuse or at least to punish those who abuse them.
The 1994 Amendment fulfilled this need. Any person who
causes physical harm to an Indian child on a reservation is now
subject to federal prosecution. The physical harm can be as
minor as a slap or as serious as broken bones or internal injuries.
If the focus remained solely on the best interest of the child,
further examination of the 1994 Amendment would be unneces-
134. Tide Eighteen, United States Code § 1365 defines serious bodily injury as
"bodily injury which involves-(A) a substantial risk of death; (B) extreme physical pain;
(C) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or (D) protracted loss or impairment of the
function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty." 18 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994); see
alho 18 U.S.C. § 113(b)(2) (1994) (stating that "the term 'serious bodily injury' has the
meaning given that term in Section 1365 of this tide.").
135. Substantial bodily injury is defined as "(A) a temporary but substantial disfigure-
ment; or (B) a temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any
bodily member, organ, or mental faculty." 18 U.S.C. § 113 (1994).
136. Id.
137. 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(5) now provides:
Simple assault, by fine under this tide or imprisonment for more than six
months, or both, or if the victim of the assault is an individual who has not
attained the age of 16 years, by fine under this tide or imprisonment for not
more than one year, or both.
Id.
138. 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(7) (1994). Section 113(b) defines "substantial bodily
injury." 18 U.S.C. § 113(b) (1994).
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sary. Unfortunately, the issues are not that simple.
The Legislature failed to consider the philosophical issues
raised by the Amendment. These issues include the impact this
Amendment has upon tribal sovereignty and the extremely broad
scope of assault crimes now included in the MCA. After an
examination of these issues, the reader should recognize that the
federal government must clearly and unequivocally decide
whether children will be protected at all costs or whether the
1994 Amendment was in error.
2. The Impact of the 1994 Amendment on Tribal
Sovereignty
The 1994 Amendment significantly impacts tribal sovereign-
ty. Assume an Indian commits the crime of simple assault
against another Indian on a nonPL-280 reservation. The crime
must be punished, if at all, by the tribe because the MCA does
not apply."3 9 Tribal authorities must decide whether to prose-
cute. If they decide not to, a governmental decision is made and
should be respected.
Some tribal governments decided not to prosecute the
crime of physical abuse. The 1994 Amendment, therefore, is a
response to this governmental decision and in effect tells tribal
governments that their decision is unacceptable. The 1994
Amendment shows little respect for tribal sovereignty and it is a
serious deviation from the original intent of the MCA to
minimally intrude on tribal sovereignty by supplying the federal
government with limited criminal jurisdiction on the reserva-
tion.140
Efforts to protect tribal sovereignty create a need to strike
a balance between a child's right to protection and the tribe's
inherent sovereignty to govern its members as it chooses. The
need to strike a balance is not new. The United States Supreme
Court rejected the argument that an individual's rights should
be sacrificed for the sake of tribal sovereignty in Keeble v. United
States.
141
Keeble raised the issue of whether an Indian defendant is
139. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994) (example assumes the simple assault was committed
against a person not under 16 years of age).
140. See COHEN, supra note 5, at 290-91.
141. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 206 (1973).
1996]
31
Zehnder: Who Should Protect the Native American Child: A Philosophical Deb
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1996
MLLUAM M/TCIELL LAW REV!EW
entitled to an instruction on lesser included offenses. 42 The
government argued "the interests of an individual Indian
defendant in obtaining a jury instruction on a lesser offense
must fall before the congressionally sanctioned interests of the
tribe in preserving its inherent jurisdiction."143 The Court held
that an individual defendant's rights cannot be sacrificed for the
greater good of the tribe."
The 1994 Amendment raises the question of whether a
child's right to be protected should be sacrificed to preserve
tribal sovereignty. If children are protected by the 1994
Amendment to the MCA, should the impact on tribal sovereignty
be ignored in favor of protecting the child from harm or at least
punishing the person who caused the harm?145  Regardless of
the answer, Congress failed to address, or perhaps even recog-
nize, this issue.
It can be argued that the true impact of the Amendment on
tribal sovereignty may be de minimis. The new language of the
MCA does not divest the tribe of its ability to also prosecute the
crime.146 Similar concerns about tribal sovereignty were
addressed when the MCA was amended to include sexual
abuse. 147 The House Judiciary Committee rejected any possible
jurisdictional divestment and specifically noted the amendment
only extended concurrent jurisdiction to the federal govern-
ment.'" The Committee emphasized that the MCA was never
142. Id.
143. Id. at 209.
144. Id. The Court declared that if "an Indian is prosecuted in tribal court under
the provisions of the Act, this Act does not require that he be deprived of the
protection afforded by an instruction on a lesser included offense." Id. at 213.
According to the Court, "no interest of a tribe [was] jeopardized by this decision." Id.
145. See Edward L. Thompson, ProtectingAbused Children: A Judge's Perspective on Public
Law Deprived Child Proceedings and the Impact of the Indian Child Welfare Acts, 15 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 1, 6 (1980). Thompson argues that where a child's and a parent's rights
conflict, the child's rights must prevail. Id. This argument also could be made when the
child's rights and the interests of the tribe conflict.
146. See supra note 51 (discussing conflict between the legislative history of the MCA
and secondary source commentary on the MCA).
147. H.R. REP. No. 528, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986), rqprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1298. The original amendment used the term "felonious sexual molestation of a
minor." Congress, however, later struck this term and substituted the term "felony
under chapter 109A." 18 U.S.C. 1153(a) (1994). Chapter 109A includes sex crimes
against both children and adults. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241-45 (1993).
148. Sexual Molestation of a Minor in Indian Country Act, Pub. L. No. 99-303, 1986
U.S.C.CAN. (99 Stat.) 1304.
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intended to divest tribes of criminal jurisdiction.149
Similarly, the 1994 Amendment to include assault against a
person under the age of sixteen does not appear to divest tribal
jurisdiction. The 1994 Amendment gives either, or both,
sovereigns the ability to invoke criminal jurisdiction and protect
children, while leaving the tribe's authority intact. 150 Despite
continued concurrent jurisdiction, the 1994 Amendment
represents an expansive federal intervention into one more area
of tribal life and decreases the separation between the tribe and
the federal government.
3. The 1994 Amendment Deviated from the Historical
Intent and Development of the Major Crimes Act
The 1994 Amendment gives the federal government greater
criminal jurisdiction on reservations than it has ever had in the
past. The 1994 Amendment does not divest the tribe of
jurisdiction to prosecute physical abuse crimes jointly with the
federal government.1 51  It does, however, increase federal
involvement by including minor crimes. Prior to the 1994
Amendment, the MCA included only the most serious crimes
and left all minor crimes to the tribes.
152
The word "major" means "requiring great attention or
concern; serious. "153 The plain understanding of the statute
would require that the MCA include only the most serious
crimes. 5 4  Prior MCA amendments were in line with the
intended scope of the MCA. The amendment to include sexual
abuse was appropriate because any type of sexual contact with a
149. See id. Specifically, the Committee noted that "the Major Crimes Act confers
concurrent jurisdiction over certain offenses upon Federal courts. That act does not
(nor was that act intended to) divest Indian tribes of their jurisdiction over tribal
members who commit offenses listed in the Act." Id.
150. See Wheeler v. United States, 435 U.S. 313, 330-31 (1976) (discussing the "dual
sovereignty" of tribal and trial courts over certain criminal conduct occurring within
tribal nations). But see 139 CONG. REC. H10,259-01 (1993) (calling for a halt of efforts
to narrow tribal jurisdiction and increased respect for tribal sovereignty and authority).
151. See supra note 51 (discussing the issue of whether the MCA divests the tribes of
concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute the crime as well).
152. 16 CONG. REc. 934, 935 (1885) (noting the first attempt to pass the MCA was
defeated because it included both misdemeanors and felonies).
153. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICrIONARY 757 (2d College ed. 1985).
154. See generally Dussias, supra note 2, at 21 n.81 (discussing tribal verses federal
criminal jurisdiction on nonPL-280 reservations in terms of "major" and "minor"
crimes); Cubberley, supra note 51, at 226.
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child is a serious crime. 5' Similarly, the crimes of kidnap-
ping,"' assault with intent to commit rape,
1 7 maiming, 15
and assault resulting in serious bodily injury15 9 are all grave
crimes. The need to include these crimes was even more
appropriate in light of the ICRA limitations on sentencing.
Until 1994, all the crimes included in the MCA deserved the
description "major".
Most would agree that it is unacceptable for any child to
suffer physical harm. From an emotional viewpoint, most would
also agree that physical abuse is a serious crime deserving serious
consequences. Yet, most individuals would concur in the
statement that the nondisciplinary slapping of a child should not
be classified as a felony or major crime. However, this is
precisely what the 1994 Amendment did-it included the crime
of simple assault or the slapping of a child. The level of harm
caused by slapping a child cannot compare with the harm caused
by the other crimes included in the MCA-such as assault with
a dangerous weapon, maiming, manslaughter or murder. Thus,
the 1994 Amendment conflicts with the intended meaning of the
MCA.
The 1994 Amendment would not be as troublesome if the
legislative history reflected an intent to declare all physical child
abuse, regardless of form and severity, a major crime deserving
federal prosecution and penalties. The legislative history,
however, is silent on this issue."6  In the absence of such
intent, the 1994 Amendment remains an anomaly in the MCA.
Again, a specific example is useful to understand the
concern about the Amendment. Joanne, an Indian on a nonPL-
280 reservation, hits her daughter, Sherri, with an open hand,
twice in a single incident. Joanne was not disciplining Sherri at
155. See infra note 192 and accompanying text (discussing tribal support for the
inclusion of sex crimes in the MCA).
156. Indian Crimes Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-297, 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. (94 Stat.)
1129.
157. S. REP. No. 1770, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.CAN.
3653, 3654.
158. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984
U.S.C.CAN. (98 Stat.) 3182, 3498.
159. S. REP. No. 721, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968), rep rinted in 1968 U.S.C.CAN.
1837, 1866.
160. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 170201, 108 Stat. 2042.
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the time. In all respects, this appears to be an isolated incident.
The MCA makes this act a federal crime and Joanne can be
prosecuted at the federal level. While the sentence she receives
would likely be minimal if she is convicted, the prosecution will
occur far from the reservation and far from Indian customs and
practices. 161 More importantly, since there are few federal
women's prisons in the United States, Joanne, and other female
defendants, would be incarcerated far from their families.
1 62
In contrast, if federal intervention was not possible and the tribe
alone addressed the incident, Joanne would remain in the
community and possibly receive community support and
services.'63 In sum, prosecuting Joanne in the federal system
is difficult to justify when the source of authority is the Major
Crimes Act.
4. The 1994 Amendment Represents an Example of
Minimal Legislative Insight Into the Ultimate Effect of
the Statute
The minimal legislative history available on the MCA is at
odds with the actual statute enacted. The history reflects that
the 1994 Amendment was intended to fill the statutory void
between simple assault and assault resulting in serious bodily
injury statute. The Legislature stated that it intended to fill this
161. See Dussias, supra note 2, at 39.
The United States Supreme Court recognizes that tribal traditions and values play
a strong role in tribal punishments. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 331-32
(1978). Cf Native Village of Venetie IRA Counsel v. Alaska, 918 F.2d 797, 803 (9th Cir.
1990) (noting that the Indian Child Welfare Act includes an express finding that when
states exercise jurisdiction "over Indian child custody proceedings... [they] have often
failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and
social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.") (citations omitted).
162. The lack of a women's prison in all states decreases the chances of family
reunification because the inmate will not be able to easily keep in contact with her
children and family.
163. The tribe may be the best government authority to address child abuse. The
child's best interest are better determined by those in the child's own community. The
Indian Child Welfare Act is an example of a Congressional determination that tribes are
better suited than non-Indian courts to determine the best interests of Indian children
in adoption and termination of parental rights cases. See Thompson, supra note 146,
at 11. The Indian Child Welfare Act was an attempt by Congress to end the alarming
number of Indian children who were being removed from their homes on the
reservations to be placed in non-Indian homes. Id. If an ethnic community resolves its
societal problems, the community's values, traditions, and customs will be considered
and utilized to find a solution.
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gap with the newly enacted statute "assault resulting in substan-
tial bodily injury".M
If Congress had simply enacted the statute-assault resulting
in serious bodily injury-and amended the MCA to include it,
the problems addressed in this article would not exist. The
Legislature, however, did not stop with that amendment. It
included within the MCA the language "an assault against an
individual who has not attained the age of sixteen years."
165
This Amendment went well beyond fulfilling a need for a
moderate severity assault statute and included the full range of
assault. The final result of the "Assault Against a Child Statute"
far surpassed the stated legislative objective. The ability to
federally prosecute all ranges of assaults against children under
the age of sixteen occurred without apparent consideration for
the consequences of this action.
The Congressional Budget Office's financial impact opinion
demonstrates Congress' lack of awareness of this Amendment's
impact. This opinion indicates the Amendment will have no net
impact on the federal budget.1" This conclusion demonstrates
that Congress was unaware that the statute significantly increased
the jurisdiction of the federal government on the reservations.
If the statute is fully used, it brings with it increased budgets for
the United States Attorneys' Offices, public defenders' offices,
the court system, and the penal system. It also is likely to
increase social service costs, as these types of prosecutions would
bring the family to the attention of social services. Furthermore,
the financial impact opinion contains a naive statement that any
additional costs to the federal government will be recouped by
an increased fines basis. However, most people living on Indian
reservations and those who perpetrate physical abuse are unlikely
sources of a secured base for the collection of imposed fines.
167
Congressional ignorance of the true nature of the statute it
enacted is also seen in the statement: "Most of these crimes
[assaults] are prosecuted by state authorities rather than federal
authorities, regardless of the age of the victim.""6 This state-
164. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 170201(e), 108 Stat. 2042.
165. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1994).
166. H.R. REP. No. 103-461, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1994).
167. See infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text (discussing tribal poverty).
168. H.R. REP. No. 103-461, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1994).
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ment demonstrates true ignorance of the federal government's
sole jurisdiction over certain crimes occurring on nonPL-280
reservations. Given the tribe's failure to prosecute physical abuse
against children and the federal government's authority to do so
under the 1994 Amendment, federal authorities will be prosecut-
ing significant numbers of abuse cases on the reservation. The
1994 Amendment has a significant potential impact on both the
number of physical abuse prosecutions in the federal system and
the strain on the federal budget. Hence, the consequences of
the 1994 Amendment were not fully explored before Congress
passed it.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE 1994 AMENDMENT: CHAPTER
113A-A STATUTE SPECIFICALLY TAILORED TO THE CRIME OF
PHYSICAL ABUSE AND RESPECTFUL OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
Before the 1994 Amendment, children on nonPL-280
reservations were not adequately protected. 69 Tribes were not
prosecuting the crime of child physical abuse, and even if they
did, tribes could not adequately punish the perpetrator under
the limitations of the ICRA. The federal government also could
not adequately protect children on the reservations because the
applicable laws did not contain workable definitions that fit the
crime committed. The 1994 Amendment completely addressed
these problems. The question remains, however, whether the
1994 Amendment was the best solution to the problem. The
Amendment addressed the practical problem of protecting
children, but it left unresolved philosophical issues created by
the scope of the Amendment.
The Legislature must specifically enunciate whether its goal
is to protect children, without regard to tribal sovereignty or the
historical development of the MCA, or whether it erred and
should now modify the scope of the Amendment. The Legisla-
ture could accomplish both goals, however, by adopting a statute
that more accurately reflects the crime committed; offers
169. See 141 CONG. REc. S2840, S2840-41 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1995) (statement of Sen.
McCain). Senator McCain noted during senate discussions on the Indian Child
Protection and Family Violence Prevention Act that Indian reservations acted as a
magnet for child abusers. He reflected, "[c]hild abuse perpetrators were aware that the
conditions of detecting, reporting, investigating, and preventing crimes upon children
were in such a sorry state that there [sic] crimes would rarely be detected." Id. at
S2841.
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sufficient protection to Indian children; fits the characterization
of a "major" crime; and minimizes the intrusion on tribal
sovereignty. A specific substantive child physical abuse statute
coupled with a corresponding amendment to the MCA would
accomplish this goal.
A. An Alternative to the Current Language of 18 U.S.C. § 113 and
18 U.S.C. § 1153: A Specific Physical Abuse Statute
The most significant problems with the 1994 Amendment
are its over-breath and the intrusion into tribal decision-making.
A narrowly tailored assault statute, which specifically addresses
the crime of physical abuse but leaves minor assaults to tribal
jurisdiction, would minimize these issues. As previously dis-
cussed, the assault of a child is not the same crime as an assault
against an adult. A statute should accordingly be enacted that
specifically encompasses the crime committed.
The crime of physical abuse against a child should be
included in the federal code as follows:
CHAPTER 113A: ASSAULT OF A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF
EIGHTEEN
(a) Whoever, by intentional acts or a series of intention-
al acts, within the special maritime and territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States commits the following shall be
guilty of the crime of Assault of a Person Under the Ages of
Eighteen and shall be punished according to subdivision
(b):
(1) Assault causing physical injury, which includes
but is not limited to: failure to thrive; first and
second degree burns caused by immersion, objects
including but limited to, cigarettes, curling irons,
and stove tops, chemicals, electricity, or friction;
severe bruising; blows causing a subdural hemato-
ma; and a major avulsion, laceration, or penetration
of the skin.
(2) Assault resulting in substantial bodily injury,
which includes but is not limited to: injuries causing
nonfacial disfigurement likely to disappear as the
victim matures, and temporary but substantial loss
of any bodily member not resulting in a breakage of
that member.
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(3) Assault resulting in serious bodily injury, which
includes but is not limited to: third degree burns;
internal injuries; broken bones; permanent disfig-
urement; temporary or permanent disfigurement of
the facial area; or an injury creating substantial risk
of death.
(4) Engages in a pattern of assaultive behavior over a
period of time. A pattern of abusive behavior includes
behavior that results in injuries to the child which
do not amount to an assault under (a) (1), (a) (2),
or (a) (3). The behavior includes, but is not limited
to: the repeated striking of a child for nondisciplin-
ary purposes; using inanimate objects to inflict
punishment over a period of time where such
striking results in marks on the child; repeated
blows leaving skin bruising or resulting in soft tissue
swelling.
(b) A person convicted of Assault Against a Person
Under the Age of Eighteen shall be punished as follows:
(1) If convicted of assault causing physical injury
to a sentence of not more than two (2) years
imprisonment, and/or a fine of $5,000.
(2) If convicted of assault resulting in substantial
bodily injury to a sentence of not more than five (5)
years imprisonment, and/or a fine of $10,000.
(3) If convicted of assault resulting in serious
bodily injury to a sentence of not more than ten
(10) years imprisonment, and/or a fine of $20,000.
(4) If convicted of engaging in a pattern of
assaultive behavior to a sentence of not more than
two (2) years imprisonment, and/or a fine of
$5,000.
Nothing herein shall be interpreted as precluding a charge
of any other violation within this title.'7°
The 1994 amended language of Title 18, United States Code
170. The examples used in Chapter 113A were drawn from the following state laws:
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3623(A)(2) (1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-303(1)(a) (I)
(1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-700 (1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5 (1988)
(repealed 1989).
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Section 113 should then be deleted from the statute.
Chapter 11 3A addresses the need to protect victims of child
physical abuse and the tribe's inability to give children this
protection."' It also recognizes that the federal government's
criminal jurisdiction on the reservations should not be overly
intrusive. It excludes the cases of slapping, like that described
earlier involving Joanne, but would still permit prosecution of
the abuse suffered by Sara and Timmy."7 The 1994 Amend-
ment recognized only the need to protect children without a
corresponding recognition of tribal sovereignty. Chapter 113A
takes into account both issues.
Simply adopting Chapter 113A as set forth above would be
insufficient to protect Indian children living on nonPL-280
reservations. Enabling language would also have to be added to
the MCA to permit federal prosecution of Indian verses Indian
crimes. The language of the 1994 Amendment, "assault of a
person under the age of sixteen" should be deleted and replaced
with, "assault against a person under the age of eighteen as
defined in Chapter 113A." The MCA would then read:
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property
of another Indian or other person any of the following
171. Chapter 113A provides a mechanism for federal prosecution of physical abuse.
This proposed statute and this comment do not address the issue of the increased costs
of prosecuting child physical abuse. The United States Attorneys' Office is most likely
unequipped to deal with the increased case load this amendment, or even the 1994
Amendment, could generate. See Dussias, supra note 2, at 38-39 (discussing problems
associated with relying on the United States Attorneys' Office to prosecute crimes on
the reservation); ef. 140 CONG. REC. S5189, S5191 (daily ed. May 4, 1994). This
comment also does not address the need to increase social services on the reservations.
See 141 CONG. REc. S2840, S2841 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1995) (noting increased education
about child abuse brings with it the need for additional funds to address cases
prompted by the education). Discussion concerning the financial impact of either the
1994 Amendment or Chapter 113A are beyond the scope of this comment.
The best solution for ending physical abuse is not to simply prosecute and lock up
all abusers. The preferable solution would be a combination of education and the
provision of services to families at risk. More significantly, child victims need counseling
and services to help them deal with and resolve the psychological issues created by the
abuse. The 1994 Amendment failed to address these issues at all. At present, Indian
Social Services are unable to adequately assist all persons needing help. Seegnerally 140
CONG. REC. S13,539, S13,545-46 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1994); 141 CONG. REC. H5737 (daily
ed. June 8, 1995) (providing increased funds for Indian Child Protection and Family
Violence Prevention Act); 141 CONG. REc. S2840, S2840-41 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1995)
(statement of Sen. McCain) (also dealing with increased funds for Indian Child
Protection and Family Violence Prevention Act).
172. See supra part II.A.1.
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offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping,
maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest, assault with
intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon,
assault resulting in serious bodily injury, assault against a
person under the age of eighteen as defined in Chapter 113A,
arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of
this title within the Indian country, shall be subject to the
same law and penalties as all other persons committing any
of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States.
1. A Practical Application of Title Eighteen, United
States Code Chapter 113A
The assault on Timmy Barrett by his father was used earlier
to illustrate the different protection afforded non-Indian
children and that withheld from Indian children. 7 The
behavior of hitting Timmy with a belt illustrates how a single
type of behavior may warrant different types of charging and
how Chapter 113A enables this. If Martin Barrett hit Timmy
only on one occasion and used only one strike, leaving red welts
that shortly disappeared, Chapter 113A would not apply. This
would be a simple assault. However repulsive this type of
behavior, many parents may use it as a form of discipline."'
Even if Martin was not disciplining Timmy, it does not warrant
federal prosecution because it is a minor assault and should be
left to the tribe.
Another scenario involving the same behavior would include
Martin hitting Timmy frequently with a belt for nondisciplinary
reasons. The marks left by the beatings do not result in injuries
severe enough to justify an assault causing physical injury charge.
Yet, this frequent behavior is more serious than an isolated
beating. The psychological impact of the repeated beatings is
probably not very different from a single beating that results in
a broken arm or rib. The charge-engaging in a pattern of
assaultive behavior-would permit federal prosecution in this
173. See supra part II.A. 1.
174. Some state statutes exclude from prosecution reasonable force against a child
when used for disciplinary purposes. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.379, subd. 1. (1994)
(stating "[r]easonable force may be used upon or toward the person of a child without
the child's consent when ... used by a parent."). Indian parents should be afforded
the same latitude.
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type of case where the perpetrator repeatedly inflicts physical
injury to a child over an extended period of time, but the injury
is not so severe as to warrant charges under the other subdivi-
sions of Chapter 113A.175
If Martin's behavior escalates and Timmy is left with severe
bruising that remains for several days, Martin could be charged
under Title Eighteen, United States Code Chapter
113A(a) (1)-assault resulting in bodily injury. Similarly, Martin
could be charged under Tide Eighteen, United States Code
Chapter 113A(a) (2) if he caused lacerations on Timmy's back
which leave scars (or disfigurement) that are likely to fade as
Timmy grows older. Chapter 113A is preferable to the 1994
Amendment because it specifically addresses the crime commit-
ted, while at the same time protects tribal sovereignty by limiting
the types of cases to which it would apply.
B. The Advantages of Title Eighteen, United States Code Chapter
113A
1. Chapter 113A is a Separate and Distinct Statute
Emphasizing the Special Nature of the Crime
Physical abuse of a child is a crime entirely separate from
assaulting an adult. The crime involves a violation of the
complete trust a child has in his or her caretaker. Children are
absolutely vulnerable and likely to be totally dependent upon the
person abusing them. This element does not exist in other
assault crimes. The 1994 Amendment recognized this distinction
to some extent, but it did not go far enough. A separate statute
for child abuse is more appropriate than trying to fit the crime
into the general assault statute.
176
The Legislature recognizes the unique circumstance that
arises when children are involved in the criminal justice
system. 177 For example, many statutes specifically deal with the
175. The assault involving Robert used in this article's introduction could also be
charged under Title 18, United States Code Chapter 11SA(a) (4)--engaging in a pattern
of assaultive behavior. See supra part II.B.4.
176. The final clause of Chapter 113A, "Nothing herein shall be interpreted to
preclude charging an individual with another crime within this title," still permits
charging a person under any of the other assault statues if they more accurately
describe the crime committed. See supra part II.B.4.
177. The unique role of children in the system was adeptly summarized when one
attorney noted, "[c] hild victims of crime are specially handicapped. First, the criminal
[Vol. 22
42
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol22/iss3/7
THE NATIVE AMERICAN CIILD
issues raised by child witnesses. These statutes specifically
provide that children are competent to testify and that the
defendant has the burden of establishing that they are not.
1 78
Other statutes provide alternative means for children to testify if
a special need is shown. 179  Furthermore, other criminal
statutes recognize that children are more vulnerable and the
crimes committed against them more heinous.1 80  Chapter
1 13A, therefore, simply carries this recognition one step further.
Chapter 113A also recognizes the form physical abuse takes.
While some physical abuse cases involve slapping or stomping,
other cases exist which involve forms of abuse not contemplated
when the assault statutes were developed. Physical abuse can
take the form of burns inflicted in an horrific number of ways or
beatings with any inanimate object imaginable. Chapter 113A
takes these forms of abuse into account and attempts to place
them on some type of severity scale. It contains examples of
physical abuse which leaves no question that this statute was
intended to apply to these crimes, while clearly leaving the field
open to permit the prosecution of any form of abuse created in
the abuser's sadistic mind.
The 1994 Amendment to the assault statute did not contain
sufficient definitions or a proper punishment grading scale.
Under this statute, prosecutors were left to wonder whether the
crime they were attempting to charge properly fit into the
available options. The inadequacy of sufficient definitions is
demonstrated by an example used earlier. An Indian mother
burns her Indian child multiple times with cigarettes.
8 1
Without Chapter 113A, the prosecutor's options are assault
resulting in substantial bodily injury, assault resulting in serious
bodily injury, assault with a deadly weapon, or simple assault.
To prove substantial bodily injury, the prosecutor must show
justice system distrusts them and puts special barriers in the path of prosecuting their
claims tojustice. Second, the criminal justice system seems indifferent to the legitimate
special needs that arise from their participation." DEBRA WHITCOMB, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, WHEN THE VICTIM Is A CHILD 15 (2d ed. 1992) (quoting D. LLOYD, PRESIDENT'S
TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, Final Report 51 (Dec. 1982)).
178. 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (1994).
179. Id. § 3509(b) (1) (B). A child may testify by two-way closed circuit television or
have their deposition taped. Id.
180. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2243, 2244 (1994).
181. See United States v. Barrett, 8 F.3d 1296, 1297-98 (1993).
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a "temporary but substantial disfigurement."'82 As a result, the
following questions arise: Do cigarette burns cause disfigure-
ment? More importantly, how can an injury that causes a
"substantial disfigurement" be temporary?
Serious bodily injury presents the same problems. The
relevant definition of serious bodily injury requires extreme
physical pain"' or protracted and obvious disfigurement.
184
Does a cigarette burn constitute extreme physical pain? Does a
cigarette burn result in a protracted and obvious disfigurement
when, for example, the burns are located on the child's feet,
hands, or stomach? Arguably, a cigarette burn causes extreme
physical pain to a child. While a charge of serious bodily injury
is a more viable option than a charge of assault resulting in
substantial bodily injury, it is still tenuous.
The two remaining crimes, simple assault and assault with
a deadly weapon, similarly are not adequate options. A cigarette
is an unlikely deadly weapon at least when only its burning
ability is considered. Similarly, simple assault is an inadequate
charge. Burning a child multiple times should never be
characterized as minor or a misdemeanor. 18' Therefore, this
is not the type of behavior that should be characterized as a
simple assault.
186
Although a prosecutor may have no doubt that this case
should be charged, problems arise since the 1994 version of the
assault statute contains the only charging options, and they did
not adequately fit the behavior involved. Chapter 113A,
however, eliminates all definition based hurdles and the
inadequate fit between the crime charged and the crime
committed.
182. 18 U.S.C. § 113(b)(1)(A) (1994).
183. 18 U.S.C. § 113(b)(2) (1994) (stating the definition ofUserious bodily injury"
has the meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. § 1365(g)(3)(B) (1994)).
184. 18 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (2) (1994) (defining "serious bodily injury" in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1365(g)(3)(C) (1994)).
185. See 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(5) (1994) (providing a punishment for not more than
one year if the victim is under the age of 16).
186. One physician notes, "[t]he burning of children with cigarettes, especially on
the palms and soles, is a frequent finding. This is a particularly sadistic form of abuse
that may indicate a severe psychiatric disturbance in the parent." KERNS, supra note 99,
at 29.
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2. Chapter 113A Expands the Class of Children to Whom
the Assault Statute Would Apply
The 1994 Amendment created an arbitrary line between
those children it will and will not protect. The current law
permits prosecution under the MCA only if the victim is under
age sixteen. This limitation leaves children aged sixteen and
older with no more protection than they had before the
Amendment. Physical abuse does not end simply because a child
reaches the magical age of sixteen.8 7 In most contexts, chil-
dren cannot easily leave home until the age of eighteen. Before
this age, the child is trapped in his or her home and subject to
physical violence. Chapter 113A would eliminate this arbitrary
limitation and recognize that the adverse psychological and
physical effects of abuse do not end simply because the child is
sixteen.
3. Chapter 113A is More Narrowly Tailored Than the
1994 Amendment
The 1994 Amendment permitted federal prosecution when
a parent slapped a child. This inclusion goes well beyond the
intent behind the MCA. Chapter 113A represents a balance
between the tribe's right to be free of federal intrusion and a
child's right to be protected regardless of race. It leaves to the
tribes those crimes that can be adequately punished within the
one year incarceration limitation of the ICRA. While providing
a line between those crimes that should be left to the tribe and
those that warrant federal prosecution, it offers sufficient
flexibility in its definitions and its inclusion of a pattern of
physical abuse to ensure that children are still protected.
Chapter 113A, unlike the 1994 Amendment, reflects the original
intent behind the MCA to deal only with the most serious of
crimes.
4. Chapter 113A Offers Protection to Indian Children in
Recognition of the Tribe's Financial Inability to do so
Tribal failure to prosecute physical abuse has never been
heralded as a tribal endorsement for the physical abuse of
187. See, e.g., State v. Soukup, 376 N.W.2d 498,499 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (reviewing
cases where child has been physically abused at age 16 and older).
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children. The tribes' failure to react to physical abuse may
instead be a simple product of economics. Most tribes lack the
resources necessary to prosecute crimes and to impose an
appropriate punishment. a  Most tribes do not have the
financial resources to maintain a court system, a jail, and a
probation system.
189
Arguably, the tribes' lack of resources may change with the
increase of gaming.'O Even if gaming continues to be success-
ful, it is unlikely that building a criminal justice system will be
the tribes' first priority. More likely, the tribe will use the money
to provide the basic essentials for its members and to build a
solid tribal infrastructure. Continued concurrent jurisdiction
under Chapter 113A between the tribe and the federal govern-
ment protects children while allowing the tribe to build a solid
infrastructure so it could assume primary responsibility for
prosecuting and punishing crimes on the reservation. 19'
The narrow scope of Chapter 113A should not be as
offensive to the tribes as the 1994 Amendment. This assumption
is based upon tribal support for including sexual abuse in the
MCA. Tribes supported this amendment because they realized
they could not adequately protect the children. The National
Congress of American Indians submitted a resolution in support
of the amendment which read, "[I] t is necessary and crucial to
effective law enforcement on Indian reservations and to protect
the mental health and physical well-being of Indians that
[f] ederal law be amended to permit [f] ederal prosecution of
188. See Russel Lawrence Barsh, Kennedy's Criminal Code Reform Bill and What It Doesn't
Do For the Tribes, 6 AM. INDIANJ., Mar. 1980, at 11 (blaming the federal government's
award of limited funds to tribes as a cause of the tribe's inability to police themselves);
see also 139 CONG. REC. H10,259, H10,262 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1993) (Rep. George Miller
noting that the federal government failed to provide adequate funds to tribes for court
systems for the past 20 years).
189. A tribe's lack of resources contributes heavily to the tribe's inability to
prosecute tribal members. Peak, supra note 38, at 401; see also Goldberg, supra note 7,
at 542 (noting the lack of federal funding for tribal courts contributed to the enactment
of PL-280); 139 CONG. Rc. H10,259 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1993).
The 1980 census revealed that the per capita income on the Navajo Reservation was
$2,400.00. Karen Lee Swaney, Waiver of Indian Tribal Sovereign Immunity in the Context
of Economic Development, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 389, 403 (1989); see also 140 CONG. REC. S5189
(daily ed. May 4, 1994) (noting that tribes should receive additional funding to develop
an effective judicial system).
190. Gaming refers to the tribe's gambling activities which are becoming a
significant source of income for tribes.
191. Cf COHEN, supra note 5, at 337.
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serious child sexual abuse offenses."1 92  The tribes' similar
inability to address physical abuse should ensure that the narrow
scope of Chapter 113A would not be as objectionable to the
tribes as the 1994 Amendment.
Permitting federal prosecution of child physical abuse
crimes may in fact be in the tribes' long-term best interests. If
child abuse continues unabated on reservations, the ability of
tribes to achieve total independence could be jeopardized.
Children are the tribes' single most important resource.' 93 Yet,
victims of child abuse are less likely to develop into healthy
adults. Moreover, child abuse may be a product of the
reservations' social problems of alcoholism, unemployment, and
poverty.194 These social problems all contribute to stress which
in turn can lead to child abuse.'95 Furthermore, child abuse
192. Sexual Molestation of a Minor in Indian Country Act, Pub. L. No. 99-303, 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. (99 Stat.) 1298, 1299.
193. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (1994) (providing that "there is no resource that is more
vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children."); see
also 139 CONG. REC. S15,638, S15,645 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1993) (noting children are this
country's most valuable resource but they are also the most vulnerable).
Representative Schroeder made the following statement during House debates
about a bill that would permit child abuse victims to garnish former federal employees'
retirement benefits to collect civil damage awards for damages arising from sexual
abuse: "[P]rotecting our children from child abuse in the first case is of vital
importance, but we must be equally attentive to those children that we failed to protect.
A nation that does not protect its children is a nation without a future." 140 CONG.
REC. H9176 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1994). While she was speaking about all child abuse
victims, her comments are particularly relevant to the Indian culture that is dependent
upon the passage of customs and traditions for its very existence.
194. The Native American population leads other racial groups in unemployment,
child mortality, violent death and alcoholism. Peak, supra note 38, at 486; see also 141
CONG. REC. S1 1,971 (daily ed. July 10, 1995) (noting per capita income of Indians is
$4,500); 140 CONG. REC. S9160 (daily ed. July 18, 1994) (Senator Dorgan notes that
poverty on the reservations and its associated problems contribute to the number of
child abuse cases on the reservations); Ken Peak and Jack Spender, Crime in Indian
Country: Another "Trail of Tears", 15J. OF CRIM. JUST. 485, 486 (1987); GETCHES ET AL.,
supra note 14, at 9-11; Help the Indians Solve Their Problems, U.SA TODAY, Feb. 9, 1989,
at 8A (noting the following statistics about Indians living on reservations: 58% are
unemployed; 41% live below the poverty level; 21% have no indoor toilets; 56% have
no telephone; and 16% have no electricity); Daniel Golden, The Most Desolate Place, THE
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 19, 1989, at 18 (stating that 80% of potential workers on the Pine
Ridge Reservation are unemployed and half of all crimes by adults on the reservation
are linked to alcohol).
195. See KERNS, supra note 99, at 31 (noting "chronic stress of unemployment, health
problems, substance abuse and marital disharmony may bring marginal parents to their
wit's end."); KATHY DAVIS GRAVES & CATHERINE SHREVES, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS
OF MINNEAPOLIS, BREAKING THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE: A Focus ON PRIMARY PREVENTION
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is a learned behavior that often results in a cycle of victimiza-
tion."' Abused children are more likely to either enter into
abusive relationships or to become an abuser. 97 Unchecked
abuse results in multiple generations of victims and perpetrators.
Therefore, the tribes' future, through the protection of its
children, may best be served by permitting continued concurrent
criminal jurisdiction under the narrowly tailored provisions of
Chapter 113A. Punishing those who abuse children will break
the cycle of abuse, allowing Indian children to grow up free of
dysfunction and become strong tribal leaders.
V. CONCLUSION
The truism "No child deserves to be beaten" applies no
matter what race the child is or where that child calls home.
Working toward this truism is difficult when a nation's sovereign-
ty and values are involved. The 1994 Amendment worked
toward the truism without apparent consideration and respect
for tribal sovereignty or the history of the MCA. Its benefits
could be called into question because of its broad scope and the
conflict between its stated legislative intent and its practical
applications. Chapter 113A would protect this truism, tribal
sovereignty, and the history behind the MCA. Its provisions offer
guidance to prosecutors and definitions that fit the targeted
crime. In sum, the Legislature must resolve the questions raised
by the 1994 Amendment by repealing the 1994 language and
replacing it with language that incorporates and adopts Chapter
113A.
EFFORTS 12-13 (1990) (discussing various research findings indicating a low economic
status increases the likelihood of child abuse).
196. See GRAVES & SHREVES, supra note 195, at 12-13.
197. Id.; see also Martin Van Der Werf, Child Abuse Worsens on Reservation: Molested
Kids Later Become Predators, THE ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 29, 1993, at Al.
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VI. APPENDIX
NonPL-280 Indian Country PL-280 Lands
Non-Indian Indian Non-Indian Indian
Defendant Defendant Defendant Defendant
Non-Indian State Federal State State
Victim Government GovernmentO Government Government
and/or Tribal and/or Tribal
Government' Government4
Jurisdictional State General Crimes PL-280 PL-280
Authority Government' Act or Major
Crimes Act
Indian Victim Federal Federal State State
Governmente Government government Government or
and/or Tribal Tribal
Government Government6
Jurisdictional General Crimes Major Crimes PL-280 PL-280
Authority Act Act
'Jurisdiction in non-Indian verses non-Indian crimes committed on reservations lies with the
state government based upon the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and not
based upon legislative decisions. See New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 501 (1946);
Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 247 (1896); United States v. McBramey, 104 U.S. 621,
624 (1881).
'See Indian Crimes Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-297, 1976 U.S.CA.A.N. (94 Stat.) 1125, 1126;
Sexual Molestation of a Minor in Indian Country Act, Pub. L. No. 99-303, 1986 U.S.CAAN.
(99 Stat.) 1300.
sThe United States Supreme Court originally held that tribes did not have jurisdiction to
prosecute Indians who were not members of the tribe seeking prosecution. Duro v. Reina,
495 U.S. 676 (1990) (holding was superseded by legislation amending the ICRA, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1301 (2) and (3)); see also Dussias, supra note 2, at 18. The tribe's lack of jurisdiction was
premised upon the fact that the non-member Indian is not a member of the political entity
seeking prosecution. Id. The non-member Indian defendant had "'not given the consent of
the governed that provides a fundamental basis for power within our constitutional system;
his status as an Indian says little about his consent to the exercise of authority over him by a
particular tribe."' Id. at 34 (quoting Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 694-95 (1990)). Congress
changed this judicial absurdity by specifically extending tribal jurisdiction to all Indians
whether or not they are members of the tribe seeking prosecution. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1994).
See Dussias, supra note 2, at 36 n.155, 37 n.156 (discussing the chaotic consequences of the
Duro decision).
4Dussias, supra note 2, at 20 n.80; Cubberley, supra note 51, at 232.
5For a thorough discussion of the United States Supreme Court's reasoning for disallowing
tribal prosecution of non-Indian defendants who commit crimes on reservations, see Dussias,
supra note 2, at 27-28; see also Frank R. Pommersheim, The Cruible of Sovereignty: Analyzing
Issues of TyibalJurisdiction, 31 Amiz L. REv. 329, 333 (1989).6See Dussias, supra note 2, at 20 n.80; Cubberley, supra note 51, at 232.
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